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NOTES

CLEARING THE MUDDIED WATERS

WATER LAW
In answer to a question propounded by the United States Court of
Claims, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that under state law,
the owner of decreed water rights to divert and use water from
a natural stream does not have a right to receive the silt content
thereof, although he historically has received them. A-B Cattle Company v. United States, 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).

Whatever the amount of its element the sea gives up to the atmosphere by evaporation, the sea regains exactly the same amount from

the water which falls upon the earth and flows back to its source.
This is the work, and the law, of rivers.

-Paul Horgan, Greater River 4 (1954)
Man cannot govern the amount of water that falls as rain and snow,
but he can prevent its needless waste by careful planning and building of dams, canals, power plants, and other works.
-U.S. Dept. of Interior, The Colorado River 107 (1946)

INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas River rises in the Rocky Mountains above Leadville,
Colorado, and flows eastward on its journey to the Mississippi and
ultimately to the Gulf of Mexico. As the river descends the eastern
slope of the Rockies, it flows through the town of Pueblo, Colorado,
where the Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Company (hereinafter Bessemer)
constructed a 35-mile earthen irrigation ditch. The Bessemer ditch
has decreed water rights totalling 392 c.f.s., 70 of which have priority dates earlier than 1882. The remaining 322 c.f.s. have an 1887
priority date.
The diverted water was used by Bessemer's stockholders for irrigation of lawns, trees, truck gardens and farms in and around Pueblo.
Prior to 1974, the ditch drew directly from the river and the quality
of the diverted water mirrored the quality of the river water. Consequently, whenever the Arkansas River was silty, the water flowing
through Bessemer ditch was also silty.
On June 11, 1969, the United States initiated a condemnation
action in the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
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rado to obtain property located on the proposed site of Pueblo Dam
and Reservoir, which was part of the Frying Pan/Arkansas Reclamation Project. 1 Included in the condemnation action was the headgate
and the upper 5.3 miles of Bessemer ditch.
Bessemer, in its answer, alleged that its stockholders would be
injured by the government's proposed substituted delivery of clear
reservoir water in place of water containing silt. Subsequently, the
Bessemer stockholders, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491,2 brought an
action in the United States Court of Claims, seeking nearly $100
million in damages for the alleged taking of their property right in
the natural quality of the water, provided under their decreed right.
After initiation of the court of claims proceeding, the United States
District Court granted the government's motion to dismiss the action
without prejudice as to the silt issue to determination of that question by the court of claims. Meanwhile, the project was completed
and the upper section of the Bessemer ditch was inundated. In February 1974, the government commenced delivery of clear reservoir
water into the undisturbed remainder of Bessemer through a pipe
and valve arrangement in the base of the dam.
After hearings on the merits, the court of claims, by stipulation of
the parties, certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Colorado:3

Under Colorado law, does the owner of a decreed water right to
divert and use water from a natural stream have a right to receive
water of such quality and condition, including the silt4 content thereof, as has historically been received under that right?
After its initial hearing of the case, the Colorado Supreme Court
answered this question with a qualified "yes." Following a rehearing,
however, the court, by a 4-3 margin, changed its answer to "no."
1. Pub. L. 87-590, 76 Stat. 389 (1962) (subsequently codified at 43 U.S.C. § §616-616f
(1970), but later omitted from the Code as having limited applicability).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) provides that "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States... for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort."
3. Section 5(e) of the Frying Pan/Arkansas Project, Pub. L. 87-590, 76 Stat. 389 provides:
In the operation and maintenance of all facilities under the jurisdiction and
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior authorized by this act, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to comply with ... the laws of the State of
Colorado relating to the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of water
therein.
4. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 58 (Colo. 1978).
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Groves, writing for the majority following the rehearing,
noted that plaintiffs did not contest the government's right to substitute water under Colorado law.' Instead, plaintiffs pointed to the
language of a Colorado statute,6 which requires that substituted
water shall be of a quality and continuity to meet the requirements
for which the senior appropriator has normally used his water right.
Plaintiffs argued, and the court of claims found as a fact, that the
substitution of clear water for silty water had adverse effects on the
Bessemer ditch system. The clear water leaked through the bottom
of the ditch in greater quantity than the silty water, because the silt
tended to seal the bed and banks of the ditch. Also, the substituted
water caused increased erosion of the ditch and increased vegetation
growth within the ditch. But the majority said these findings begged
the fundamental question of whether plaintiffs had a right to the silt
content of the water, for if they had no right, they had no cause of
action for damages resulting from loss of the silt.
A. Water Defined in ConstitutionalTerms
In seeking an answer to this fundamental question, the majority
looked to Article XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution which
states:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated,
within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property

of the public and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of

the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
Emphasizing the word "water" in the provision, the majority then
cited case law 7 in support of the proposition that words used in the

constitution are to be given the natural and popular meaning in which
the words are usually understood by the people who have adopted
them. The majority then concluded that the meaning of "water" is
water only. The term does not include "silt," or "silt and water."
Thus water, exclusive of matter which may be suspended in it, is the
property subject to appropriation under the constitutional provision.' The majority implied that this "natural and popular meaning"
analysis alone was dispositive of the question propounded. 9
5. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-80-120(2) (1973).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3) (1973).
7. Prior v. Noland, 68 Colo. 263, 188 P. 729 (1920).

8. 589P.2d at 61.
9. Id
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B. Statutory Water Quality
The majority found noviolation regarding the quality requirement
set forth in the statute' I cited by plaintiffs. The government's action
of slowing down the movement of water, which resulted in settling
of silt and substituting delivery of clear water to the senior
appropriator, was not seen as an unreasonable deterioration of water
quality.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority first distinguished
Arkoosh v. Big Wood Canal Co., 48 Idaho 383, 283 P. 522 (1929). In
Arkoosh, the flushing action of clear water released from a reservoir
into a streambed caused an increase in streambed leakage, resulting in
a lessened quantity of water reaching the headgates of downstream
appropriators. In the case at bar, the majority noted that there is no
contention that the quantity of water delivered at the new Bessemer
point of diversion (at the base of the dam) had been lessened by
substitution of clear water for silty water. Thus, because there was
no streambed or ditch between the dam and Bessemer ditch, the
Arkoosh case was factually distinguishable.
The original and substituted points of diversion are critical to the
outcome of this case. If Bessemer's original headgate had been below
the dam and if the government's substitution of clear water had
caused increase seepage through the bed of the Arkansas River prior
to reaching the Bessemer headgate, the case would have clearly
aligned with Arkoosh and the result might have been different. Similarly, had Bessemer changed its point of diversion not to the base of
the dam but well downstream of the dam, leakage along the intervening riverbed would arguably have been actionable under Arkoosh.
C. Doctrine of Maximum Utilization
Bessemer was receiving its full appropriation of clear water directly into its ditch through the pipe at the base of the dam. Therefore the majority turned its eyes downstream from that point of
diversion to determine whether the Bessemer ditch system, with all
its leaks and seepage, satisfied the doctrine of maximum utilization.
Not surprisingly, the majority found the ditch system wanting. A
brief historical summary of state constitutional provisions, statutes,
and case law revealed to the majority that within that body of law
lurked the principle that there shall be maximum utilization of
water.' 1 As evidence for this principle, the majority cited the following proposition:
10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3) (1973).
11. 589 P.2d at 60.
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At his own point of diversion on a natural water course, each diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his
diversion. He is not entitled to command the whole or a substantial
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the fraction of the
whole flow to which he is entitled.' 2
Having concluded that Bessemer had no right to the silt content of
its appropriated water, the majority had no difficulty in finding that
Bessemer's use of its leaky ditches constituted less than maximum
utilization of its substituted appropriation of clear water, notwithstanding the fact that the leakage occurred not from any affirmative
act or failure to act on the part of plaintiffs, but rather from an
affirmative act of the government. While stating that the time may
not yet have arrived when all ditches can be required to be lined or
placed in pipes, the majority firmly stated that plaintiffs have no
right to use silt content to help seal leaky ditches.' I
This answer, the majority concluded, is part of the policy of Colorado that there should be maximum utilization of water and that the
maximum utilization doctrine be integrated into the law of vested
rights. To view it otherwise, Justice Groves wrote, would run contra
to a basic principle of western irrigation that conservation and maximum usage demand the storage of water in times of plenty for the
use in times of drought. 14
THE DISSENT
Because the majority found that the natural and popular meaning
of the word "water" did not include silt content thereof, it had no
occasion to review the scope of water quality protection traditionally
afforded water appropriators by the courts of Colorado. It is a review
of this law to which Justice Erickson turned in his dissent.
Since 1885, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized the principle that an appropriator cannot lessen the quantity of water, seriously impair its quality, or impede its natural flow to the detriment
of others who have acquired legal right therein.' S While it is true
that water must be put to beneficial use and the appropriator must
employ a reasonable means of diversion, the dissent notes that Colorado courts have consistently recognized the principle that decreed
appropriators are entitled to rely upon the continuation of stream
12. 589 P.2d at 60-61 (citation omitted), quoting Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo.
458,461, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (1961).
13. 589 P.2d at 61.
14. Id
15. Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1885).
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conditions as they existed at the time the appropriation was made. 1 6
These judicially-created principles were later recognized by the Colorado General Assembly through legislation. 1 7 Thus, while the majority focused on the doctrine of maximum utilization implicit in Colorado water law, the dissent notes strong support for the concept that
a Colorado water appropriator has a, judicially recognized and statutorily protected expectation to continue to receive that amount and
quality of water, within a reasonable range of acceptability, which he
has historically applied to beneficial use.
Turning to the facts, the dissent observed that the findings of the
court of claims revealed that plaintiffs, the owners of decreed rights,
have lost the use of a portion of the water which they have historically put to beneficial use. Thus, while the majority looked downstream from the point of diversion to determine whether plaintiffs'
use was in accordance with the doctrine of maximum utilization, the
dissent looked upstream to examine plaintiffs' right to rely upon
continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time the
appropriation was made.
By extending the logic of the majority opinion, Justice Erickson
found that that holding altered well-established principles of water
law. Accepting the premise that a Colorado water right does not
entitle its holder to the naturally occurring silt of a stream leads to
the conclusion that appropriators who hold decrees to specific quantities of water should have originally appropriated that quantity of
silty water which, absent the silt, would reasonably irrigate their
lands. Yet, under Colorado law, any attempt to obtain a decree for a
quantity in excess of actual needs, in anticipation of a change in water
quality, would properly have been denied.' I
Within the majority opinion, there is a suggestion that all Colorado
appropriators should be required to line their earthen ditches.' 9 Justice Erickson questioned the court's power to make such a requirement and warned of the far-reaching consequences of such a demand,
since earthen ditches are the customary method of diverting water in
Colorado. Regarding the majority's implied requirement of ditch16. 589 P.2d at 65, citing Farmers' Highline Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,
129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954), Comstock v. Ramsey, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107
(1913), and Vogel v. Minnesota Canal Co., 47 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § §37-80-120(3) and 37-92-305(5) (1973). The latter statute
provides that "substituted water shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the
requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used."
18. 589 P.2d at 66, citing Baker v. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930).
19. 589 P.2d at 68. Justice Erickson's fear that all appropriators would be forced to line
their ditches by the majority holding is perhaps exaggerated. Only those appropriators
whose ditches suffer increased seepage loss after substituted delivery of silt-free water would
be affected by the holding.

January 1980]

CLEARING THE MUDDIED WATER S

lining, the dissent cites Colorado Springs v. Bender, supra, for the
well-settled principle that a senior appropriator cannot be forced to
go beyond his economic reach to maintain his method of diversion,
when the acts of a junior appropriator make it more expensive for
the senior to use the water to which he is historically entitled."0
Thus, the dissent mustered a formidable array of Colorado case
law with connotations in opposition to the holding of the majority.
The conflict between this prior case and the majority opinion is
apparent and unresolved in the majority opinion. Perhaps it was
because of this that Justice Erickson prefaced his dissent with the
comment, "I sincerely hope that this court will reconsider this issue
in future years.''21

CONCLUSION
The practical effect of the decision is that appropriators are
stripped of the right to continued expectation of naturally occurring
water conditions, an expectation which is arguably protected by statute and case law in Colorado and other Rocky Mountain states. No
balancing of interests was mentioned or attempted by the majority.
The dissent felt a balancing is required in every case of this type to
determine whether the change in quality or condition is within a
reasonable range of acceptability for a prior appropriator when related to his beneficial use. Indeed, the rigidity of the majority opinion that water in the strict molecular sense-not silt, and not silt and
water-is the property subject to appropriation under the Colorado
constitution provides little flexibility for equitable considerations in
future cases.
The implications of this holding are both obvious and enormous.
A senior appropriator who receives substituted delivery of silt-free
water under Colorado law must either improve the efficiency of his
system or bear the losses sustained through increased leakage of his
earthen ditches. The economic reach of the senior appropriator will
not be considered under this holding, and the majority opinion can
be read to imply that he has no right to simply accept the loss by
allowing the water to leak away. Custom and efficiency of his system
prior to the substituted delivery play no part in the determination.
Such is the law in Colorado today, although the extremely close
division of the court and Justice Erickson's strong dissent indicate
that the question could appear again before long in the Colorado
courts.
STEPHEN K. BOWMAN
20. 589 P.2d at 69.
21. 589 P.2d at 62.

